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MARKETING POLICY OPTIONS FOR CONSUMER PRICE MITIGATION ACTIONS 
IN THE 2008/09 MAIZE MARKETING SEASON IN ZAMBIA 
 
By Antony Chapoto, Steven Haggblade, Julius Shawa, Thomas Jayne and Michael Weber 
Key Policy Points 
  Maize prices are rising rapidly in 2008 and are fast approaching import parity levels.   
  Maize traders, millers and farmers all agree that Zambia will likely require imports by 
early 2009 in order to avoid domestic maize supply shortages. 
  Official food balance sheets appear to have underestimated the demand for maize this 
year. They may also have slightly overestimated the size of the 2007/08 maize crop.  
Hence the slow government recognition of the need for maize imports.  
  As of late September 2008, neither the Government of Zambia (GRZ) nor the private 
sector have arranged to import maize from South Africa.  Trade sources suggest 
informal imports from Tanzania are helping to relieve the likely shortfall.   
  Zambian policy makers face a delicate balancing act:  they need to maintain 
remunerative prices for farmers, in order to stimulate maize supply response during the 
coming 2008/09 production season, while at the same time moderating maize meal price 
increases to protect urban consumers and the many rural households who are net buyers 
of maize. 
  The time to respond to this balancing act challenge is now rather than later in the 
marketing season when costs of supplies and transport will increase.  
  Several policy actions offer potential win/win options for balancing these twin concerns:  
  Policy 1.  The GRZ would allow private maize imports by issuing permits now or 
decontrol maize imports for this season so traders can lock in relatively lower grain and 
transport prices to be in a position to supply millers later in the season.  Public sector 
(FRA) maize imports would not be needed if GRZ and private traders can work together 
to produce sustainable solutions. 
  Policy 2.  GRZ would reserve/dedicate a major part of FRA stocks to sell to local traders 
and custom milling clients with maize grain in the outlying provinces during the lean 
season.  FRA could also contract with Zambian commercial farmers for “early maize”. 
  Policy 3.  GRZ and Donor partners would work together to create a workable special 
emergency fund to subsidize the cost of grain or perhaps roller meal in the months of 
November 2008 through March 2009 in order to allow millers to pay traders/importers 
market prices but not pass these full costs on to low income consumers in Zambia. 
 
Introduction:  Sharp rises in world cereal 
prices since 2007 are causing alarm among 
policy makers and consumers in Zambia. 
There is growing consensus that Zambia will  
face enormous maize price increases during 
the forthcoming lean season between  
November 2008 and March 2009 due to 
demand outstripping available grain supplies 
on the market. This situation creates a 
delicate balancing act for Zambian policy 
makers: while not giving in to excessive 
budget overruns and compromising longer-
run development plans, they need to maintain  
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high prices to farmers to produce enough 
maize in the upcoming 2008/2009 production 
season whilst keeping maize at tolerable 
prices for urban consumers and the many 
rural households who are net buyers of maize.  
 
During Zambia’s most recent production 
shortfall (the 2005/06 marketing season) the 
combination of low domestic maize 
production, government hesitation, and mixed 
signals on maize import policy produced a 
sharp spike in the 2006 lean season maize 
price (Mwanaumo et al. 2005).  All would 
agree on the importance of not allowing the 
2005/06 situation, which created great 
hardship for consumers, to repeat itself this 
year.  Against this backdrop, there is an 
urgent need for information about how the 
current maize situation is unfolding in 
Zambia and immediate policy response 
options that GRZ in partnership with the 
private sector and others can implement to 
mitigate the problem.     
 
Objectives Of This Policy Brief:  
1.  To compare current market price 
movements with maize price seasonality 
in “normal” years, in recent low-
production years and in projected 
movements in the cost of maize imports 
from South Africa up to April 2009.   
2.  To present results from a simulation 
model on the price impacts of various 
maize supply and demand scenarios.   
3.  To outline immediate policy response 
options that the GRZ can implement in 
partnership with the private sector to deal 
with the problem.  
 
Are Maize Prices for the Current 
2008/2009 Marketing Season Higher than 
“normal” -- or at Least Higher than 
Expected?   Comparison of current maize 
prices with a five-year average from normal 
harvest years suggests that, yes, current prices 
exceed “normal” levels when evaluated in US 
dollars (Figure 1).  August 2008 prices are 
already almost equal to lean season highs 
attained during the 2005/06 marketing season. 
Looking forward, the SAFEX futures price 
and rising transport rates suggest that lean 
season prices will top $400 per ton. While 
transport costs from South Africa to Lusaka 
were roughly $100/ton of maize in June 2008, 
they rose to $145/ton by August and are now 
over $200/ton as the huge demand for 
transport this year has strained capacity. What 
happened in the 2005/06 marketing season is 
perhaps the best indicator of what could 
happen to maize price if the decision to 
import or otherwise try to deal with rising 
maize prices is delayed.   
 
Likewise, 2008 maize prices in nominal 
kwacha are reaching unprecedentedly high 
levels (Figure 2), providing warning signs 
about the risks of food insecurity to low-
income households later in the season if the 
food situation is not addressed immediately.  
 
In contrast, 2008 maize prices in inflation-
adjusted kwacha are not particularly high 
compared to the past decade (Figure 3).   
However, tracking food prices in meaningful 
inflation-adjusted terms is a significant 
challenge, and results in Figure 3 may 
underestimate the degree of vulnerability 
faced by low-income consumers, given the 
available price deflators.  Given growing 
general inflation in Zambia, a low “real” 
maize may offer very little comfort to poor 
consumers.  A low “real” maize price, 
defined as the nominal maize price divided by 
a general consumer price index, simply 
means that maize prices have grown no faster 
than fuel and other prices in the economy, 
some of which have grown very rapidly 
indeed.  Unless formal as well as informal 
salaries and wages have risen as fast as the 
maize and other consumer prices, real income 
and household welfare will fall.
1    
 
Going forward into the lean season months of 
2008 and 2009, real maize grain and maize 
meal prices could increase even more rapidly 
if maize demand continues to significantly 
outstrip supply, and very high price imports 
are required.  The prices that Zambia faces 
for importing maize are also constrained by 
GMO grain issues in Zambia, and by the 
relatively short and highly sought after supply 
in South Africa of non-GMO maize. 
                                                           
1 Ideally, it would be necessary to track food price 
trends against both formal and informal wage rates and 
returns to business income for both urban and rural 
households.  Currently this is work in progress.  
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Figure 3:  Comparison of Inflation Adjusted Maize Prices and Import Parity Prices 
 in Zambian Kwacha 
 
Notes for Figures 1, 2 and 3: 
1.  Current season price, 5 year average and 2005/6 marketing season maize prices are computed as an average of 
the maize grain prices collected by  CSO and AMIC.  
2.  FRA floor price for the 2008/09 marketing season is based on the 45,000 Kwacha per 50 kg and adjusted by 
the average monthly exchange rate. 
3.  Import parity price is computed as the SAFEX futures prices plus transport cost, insurance plus 15% customs 
duty on CIF price plus 1% of total cost to cover handling and offloading.  The dotted line indicates absence of 
any futures contracts for the months of October, November, January and February.   
4.  Transport costs of US$145 and US$200 per metric tonne is based on freight costs to haul grain by road from 
Randfontein to Lusaka (estimates obtained from the Grain Traders Association). 
 
 
What Price Level Would We Expect Based 
on Production Estimates Alone?  Zambia’s 
Crop Forecast Survey (CFS) estimates the 
2008 Zambian maize crop at 1.2 million tons, 
down some 12 % from the prior year, but this 
is still a 6.2% increase in per capita 
production compared to recent moderate to 
good harvest years.  Of course, an above-
average harvest would normally lead to a fall 
in price.  Based purely on the CFS production 
estimate of  1.2 million tons, our simulation 
model suggests that Zambia’s maize price 
should be about 15% below average prices 
(Table 1).  Instead, Zambia’s maize price in 
2008 has been higher than normal (at least in 
nominal USD and nominal Kwacha terms).  
 
What Could Explain a Pattern of Higher 
Than “Expected” Prices Between the 2008 
Harvest and Lean Season to March 2009?   
 
Lower production than estimated.  If 
Zambian farmers produced closer to 1.1 
million tons during 2008, or 100 thousand  
 
 
tons less than the CFS estimate, this would 
represent a 2.6% supply reduction compared 
to recent “normal” year (Table 1).  Lower 
production would in turn lead to a price 
increase on the order of 7%.  A harvest closer 
to 1 million tons would result in an 11.5% 
production fall and a 39% increase in maize 
price.  So, in the absence of any other 
changes, a maize harvest in the range of 1.05 
million tons would result in the observed 20% 
price increase.  But other factors may well 
have changed, contributing to the observed 
maize price increase.   
 
Increased demand for maize.  Since 2000, 
growing livestock consumption and feed 
demand, higher per capita incomes in urban 
Zambia (fueled by the revived copper sector 
and booms in other primary commodities) 
would lead to more meat and maize 
consumption, directly by consumers and 
indirectly in the form of feedstock.  Real 
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level of real increases in per capita GDP 
between 2000 and 2008), coupled with a 1.2 
million ton harvest, would lead to roughly an 
11% increase in the domestic maize price 
(Table 1).   
 
Growing demand in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC), fueled by population 
growth and a similar mining boom there, may 
have contributed to increased informal 
exports.  Likewise, higher maize prices in 
Malawi, due to an apparent production 
shortfall there, will tend to attract informal 
maize exports from Zambia.  Indeed, traders 
indicate that Zambian maize has been flowing 
into both Malawi and DRC during this 
marketing season.   
 
Market uncertainty: World food markets are 
currently volatile and nervous.   This may 
have triggered aggressive purchasing by 
private grain traders in Zambia, aimed at 
acquiring stocks early in the buying season, 
which may have put upward pressure on food 
prices.  Our interviews with the farming and 
trading community suggest that traders have 
had to bid up their price to try to get more 
supplies from farmers, but with little success.  
Despite the fact that traders have acquired 
their stocks early, it is likely that prices will 
continue to rise because they have locked in 
to more costs in terms of purchasing price, 
storage and financing.  
 
FRA’s high floor price:  In 2008 the FRA 
has set a floor price of ZK 45,000 per 50kg 
bag, roughly $264 per ton, substantially 
higher than the mean Lusaka retail maize 
price of $146 per ton over the 2000-2006 
period.  But it is believed that this high FRA 
floor price did not influence private traders, 
millers and stockfeeders to move aggressively 
to outbid the FRA in order to procure needed 
supplies.  Given the size of the crop, market 
prices started the 2008 season above the FRA 
price and have remained above throughout 
the 2008 season so far, even after the FRA 
increased its buying price to ZK 
55,000/50kgs in September (Figure 1).  
 
Rising world prices.  Since millers and 
traders expect Zambia to require imports this 
season, the import parity price may already be 
influencing the market price for maize in 
Zambia.  Given production shortfalls in 
Zimbabwe and possibly Malawi, competition 
for regional transport will put upward 
pressure on transport rates over the coming 
six months. Interviews of traders in 
September 2008 indicate that transport costs 
have now risen to $220 per ton of maize.   
 
Table 1.  Simulating the Impact of Production and Income Changes on Maize Price 
 
Maize Production     Expected change in maize price due to: 
2008 production 
estimates (metric tons) 
Change from 
"normal"
*    
Production  
Change 
plus rising real 
incomes
** 
1,200,000 6.2%    -15.0%  11.0% 
1,100,000 -2.6%    7.0%  39.0% 
1,000,000 -11.5%      39.0%  80.0% 
 
Source: simulations using the model developed by Dorosh, Dradri and Haggblade (2007). 
Notes:   
*    Change in per capita production from the base (average of 8 good to moderate years between 1994 and 2004) to 
2008. 
**  Projects the impact of a 15% increase in real income per capita between 2000 and 2008 for all household groups. 
 
 
Import/Marketing Policy Options: 
Challenges and Opportunities:   There are 
four broad objectives that any policy response 
to the current food situation should seek to 
achieve:  
•  Avoid the very high costs to GRZ and 
consumers of delayed imports. Decisions 
 
  to import late would involve greater 
competition for transport with other countries 
and thereby entail higher transport costs.   
Late importation could produce the more 
extreme result of widespread hunger if local 
scarcity starts to manifest before needed 
imports arrive.   
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•  Maintain incentive prices for farmers to 
stimulate supply response in the 
2008/2009 production season.   
•  Keep maize grain supplies available in 
rural markets during the lean season for 
rural grain consumers and traders, and 
thereby help protect urban/rural net buyers 
of maize against much greater than normal 
seasonal price increases for maize meal. 
•  Find options for positive roles for both 
GRZ and private traders/importers. 
 
Specific Policy Options: To effectively deal 
with the impending maize price increases, we 
outline three policy options.  These options 
are not mutually exclusive but can be used 
together to effectively deal with the situation.  
Policy 1:  GRZ would cooperate with traders 
to develop effective incentives for private 
maize imports, eg., decontrolling custom 
duties on maize imports for this season 
and/or undertaking other reliable trust 
creating measures so that traders can lock in 
relatively lower grain and transport prices to 
be in a position to supply millers at market 
prices later in the season.   Leaving GMO 
issues aside, a hitch here is that traders have 
insisted that if they do arrange imports, the 
government would need to commit itself to 
not arranging its own importation to sell to 
mills at subsidized prices thus leaving the 
traders unable to sell their maize.   
Policy 2:  GRZ would reserve a major part of 
FRA stocks to sell in small unit lots to 
consumers and local traders in provincial and 
district markets during the lean season, so 
that low-income consumers would have the 
option of acquiring maize for processing by 
relatively inexpensive small-scale mills in 
addition to the more expensive options of 
purchasing packaged breakfast and roller 
meal.  This option would relieve some of the 
food price pressure on low-income 
consumers.  As a part of this option, it is now 
getting late, but it may still be possible for 
FRA, acting on behalf of GRZ, to contract 
immediately for production in Zambia of at 
least a 6 weeks’ supply of early maize at a 
price sufficient to make this option attractive 
to commercial farmers as long as this could 
be done without exceeding the import parity 
price.  Early maize is normally planted in 
October and becomes available in March.   
The availability of at least 6 weeks’ supply 
could help the country get through the major 
lean season before the first of the 2009 
harvest comes in around May. 
Policy 3:  GRZ and Donor partners would 
cooperate to establish a special emergency 
fund, if needed, to partially subsidize maize 
grain and/or roller meal in the months of Jan-
Mar 2009 in order to allow millers to pay 
traders/importers open market prices but not 
have all of these costs passed on to maize 
grain and maize meal consumers in Zambia. 
Conclusion:  There is evidence that maize 
prices in the 2008 /2009 marketing season in 
Zambia are already higher than normal.  And 
given SAFEX prices, demand for grain in the 
region and the revealed need for Zambian 
imports, domestic maize prices seem to be 
headed much higher during the forthcoming 
lean season. To avoid a repeat of what 
happened during the 2005/06 maize 
marketing season as a result of mixed signals 
and delayed action, the time to respond is 
now rather than later in the marketing season 
when costs of supplies and transport will 
increase. Dealing with this looming problem  
without compromising longer-run growth 
efforts requires rapid and concerted efforts by 
both GRZ and the private sector.    
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